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might be feasible to require the general contractor to utilize a main entrance
or an entrance reasonably close thereto, so as not to restrict union picketing
and publicity to a rear gate where it would lose the benefit of public opinion
and pressure. It does seem apparent nevertheless, that the remedy does not
lie in the reversal of the "ally" doctrine of Denver Building, at least not in its
entirety, simply because the result would not be industrial peace, but rather
further unrest. The sole object of closing down a multi-employer project is to
bring pressure upon the disputant to settle with the union as soon as possible.
Such economic pressure unfortunately insures neither equitable nor reasonable
settlements.
FREDRIC H. FISCHER
PRODUCTS LIABILITY-MANUFACTRER NOT LIABLE FOR ECONOM'.IC
LOSSES OF CONSUMER UNDER THEORY OF STRICT LIABILITY
In October, 1959, plaintiff entered into a conditional sales contract with
Southern Truck Sales for the purchase of a truck manufactured by defendant.
After taking possession of the truck, plaintiff found that it bounced violently,
an action known as "galloping." For eleven months after the purchase, Southern,
with guidance from defendant's representatives, made many unsuccessful at-
tempts to correct the defect. In July, 1960, the brakes failed when plaintiff
slowed down for a curve and the truck overturned. Plaintiff, who was not
personally injured, had the truck repaired for $5,466.09. In September, 1960,
after having paid $11,659.44 of the purchase price of the truck, plaintiff served
notice that he would make no more payments. Plaintiff brought action against
Southern and defendant seeking damages for repair of the truck, for the money
he had paid on the purchase price, and for profits lost in his business because
he was unable to make normal use of the truck. During the trial, plaintiff dis-
missed his action against Southern without prejudice. The lower court found
that defendant had breached its warranty to plaintiff and entered judgment for
plaintiff for $20,899.84, consisting of $11,659.44 for the payments on the truck
and $9,240.40 for lost profits. The court denied plaintiff's claim for $5,466.09
for the repair of the truck on the ground that plaintiff had not proved that the
"galloping" had caused the accident. Both plaintiff and defendant appealed.
The Supreme Court of California held, affirmed on the basis of breach of ex-
press warranty. One judge, concurring in the result, maintained that the award
should have been made on the basis of the strict liability doctrine. Seely v.
White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
The earliest cases dealing with the liability of a manufacturer to a con-
sumer were based on negligence and followed the rule that a contractor is
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not liable to a third party.' Under this harsh rule a purchaser could recover
damages caused by a defective product only from his immediate seller. In the
mid-nineteenth century the New York courts began to place a special liability
on the manufacturer of inherently dangerous products which, if negligently
made, were extremely harmful to life and limb. Thus, it was held in Thomas
v. Winchester2 that despite the absence of privity, a purchaser could recover
damages for personal injury from a manufacturer when the product, involved
was one whose function it was to injure and destroy, such as poisons, explosives,
and deadly weapons. This notion of product liability based on negligence was
slowly expanded, 3 culminating in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,4 which ex-
tended the liability of a remote manufacturer to any product which, if negligently
made, was reasonably certain to place life and limb in danger. The damages
allowed in personal injury actions have long included such elements as compensa-
tion for past loss of time and earnings due to the injury,5 loss of future earning
capacity,6 and increased living expenses caused by the injury.7 The courts soon
extended this liability based on negligence to include damage done to property.
There is now general agreement that a plaintiff may recover damages where a
product in its defective condition constitutes a threat to personal safety and re-
sults in harm to property, on the theory that ". . . the manufacturer's duty
depends not upon the results of the accident but upon the fact that his failure to
properly construct the [chattel] resulted in the accident." s Recovery was allowed
where the damage was to the chattel itself9 or where the defective chattel caused
physical damage to other property.10 Property damages have also been allowed
where the negligently made product was likely to cause only such harm to prop-
erty as actually resulted.-" This is seen most clearly in a line of cases allowing
1. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842); Vaughan v.
Menlove, 3 Bing. N.C. 468 (1837).
2. 6 N.Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852).
3. Statler v. Ray Mfg. Co., 195 N.Y. 478, 88 N.E. 1063 (1909) (recovery allowed for
personal injuries caused by exploding coffee urn); Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470, 42 Am.
Rep. 311 (1882) (scaffold which was imperfectly constructed caused personal injury).
4. 217 N.Y. 382, Ill N.E. 1050, 1916F L.R.A. 696 (1916).
5. Storrs v. Los Angeles Traction Co., 134 Cal. 91, 66 Pac. 72 (1901).
6. Bonneau v. North Shore R.R. Co., 152 Cal. 406, 93 Pac. 106 (1907).
7. Kline v. Santa Barbara Consol. Ry. Co., 150 Cal. 741, 90 Pac. 125 (1907).
8. Quackenbush v. Ford Motor Co., 167 App. Div. 433, 436, 153 N.Y. Supp. 131, 133
(3d Dep't 1915). See, e.g., Spencer v. Madsen, 142 F.2d 820 (10th Cir. 1944); Marsh Wood
Prods. Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 207 Wis. 209, 240 N.W. 392 (1932).
9. International Harvester Co. v. Sharoff, 202 F.2d 52 (10th Cir. 1953) (truck damaged
when it overturned due to defective steel used in springs) ; Quackenbush v. Ford Motor Co.,
167 App. Div. 433, 153 N.Y. Supp. 131 (3d Dep't 1915) (automobile damaged in accident
caused by defective brakes).
110. United States Radiator Corp. v. Henderson, 68 F.2d 733 (10th Cir. 1934) (fire
damage to house caused by defective furnace); Genesee County Patrons Fire Relief Ass'n
v. L. Sonneborn Sons, 263 N.Y. 463, 189 N.E. 551 (1934) (water tank exploded causing
destruction of barn).
11. Todd Shipyards Corp. v. United States, 69' F. Supp. 609 (S.D. Me. 1947) (boom
block on ship caused damage to ship); Chapman Chemical Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 630,
222 S.W.2d 820 (1949) (chemical dust used to spray crops reduced yield of crop); Schuyler-
ville Wall Paper Co. v. American Mfg. Co., 272 App. Div. 856, 70 N.Y.S.2d 166 (3d Dep't
1947) (twine used to wrap wallpaper put grease spots on paper making it unusable).
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recovery against the manufacturer of defective animal food, where the only
damage possible is to the purchaser's property.12 Although the courts were
quick to extend a manufacturer's liability to a consumer on the theory of
negligence to include recovery where the damage was to property, they balked
when it came to allowing recovery for economic losses. 13 In a case in which
adhesive, improperly compounded by the manufacturer, caused shoes purchased
from a wholesaler to be unsaleable, the court held that the manufacturer was
not liable to the purchaser for his lost profits.14 Also, where building laths failed
to retain plaster and plaintiff sued for the cost of removing and replacing the
laths, the court held that the manufacturer was not liable and said:
The duty of the manufacturer for breach of which liability attaches
runs only to those who suffer personal or property injury as a result
of either using or being within the vicinity of the use of the dangerous
instrumentality.' 5
Thus, only when the danger inherent in a defectively made article caused an
"accident" from which either personal or property damage ensued did a cause
of action based on negligence arise against a manufacturer in the absence of
privity.
16
Once it became apparent that in an action based on negligence the consumer
was limited to the recovery of personal or property damages, a new basis of
liability was sought. Plaintiffs turned to the contract principles of implied
warranty in order to broaden the coverage of protected consumers and to extend
recovery to include economic losses. Although negligence need no longer be
proved, an action for breach of implied warranty could be brought only by a
purchaser against his immediate seller.17 Due to the harshness of this rule,
several theories were developed in order to evade the privity requirement.
But see Russell v. Sessions Clock Co., 19 Conn. Supp. 425, 116 A.2d 575 (1955); Windram
Mfg. Co. v. Boston Blacking Co., 239 Mass. 123, 131 N.E. 454 (1921).
12. Pine Grove Poultry Farm v. Newton By-Products Mfg. Co., 248 N.Y. 293, 162
N.E. 84 (1928); Ellis v. Lindmark, 177 Minn. 390, 225 N.W. 395 (1929); Quaker Oats Co.
v. Davis, 33 Tenn. App. 373, 232 S.W.2d 282 (1949); Cohan v. Associated Fur Farms, 261
Wis. 584, 53 N.W.2d 788 (1952).
13. Donovan Construction Co. v. General Electric Co., 133 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn.
1955) (manufacturer of defective generators not liable for expenses or lost profits incurred
by purchaser in getting generator to function properly) ; Lucette Originals, Inc. v. General
Cotton Converters, Inc., 8 A.D.2d 102, 185 N.Y.S.2d 854 (1st Dep't 1959) (manufacturer
of rayon fabric which had offensive odor not liable to purchaser whose dresses were
unsaleable after being lined with the fabric); Price v. Gatlin, 405 P.2d 502 (Ore. 1965)
(manufacturer of defective tractor not liable to purchaser for lost profits).
14. Karl's Shoe Stores, Ltd. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 145 F. Supp. 376 (D. Mass.
1956).
15. A. J. P. Constr. Corp. v. Brooklyn Builders Supply Co., 171 Misc. 157, 159, 11
N.Y.S.2d 662, 664 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd without opinion, 258 App. Div. 747, 15 N.Y.S.2d
424 (2d Dep't 1939), aff'd without opinion, 283 N.Y. 692, 28 N.E.2d 412 (1940).
16. Trans-World Airlines, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 477, 148 N.Y.S.2d
284 (Sup. Ct. 1955), 25 Fordham L. Rev. 368 (1956), 32 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 197 (1957).
17. Gimenez v. The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 264 N.Y. 390, 191 N.E. 27
(1934); Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576, 27 A.L.R. 1533 (1923).
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Among those used were agency' 8 and third party beneficiary principles.' 9 The
courts, in a growing sympathy for the purchaser, began to allow recivery in
actions based on implied warranty despite the absence of privity, especially in
cases involving contaminated food.20 In New York, after the 1961 case of
Greenberg v. Lorenz21 which allowed recovery to members of the purchaser's
household, it appeared as if the privity requirement might be done away with en-
tirely. However, in the 1964 case of Berzon v. Don Allen Motors, Inc.,22 it was held
that an automobile manufacturer was not liable for injuries sustained by a
passenger in the purchaser's automobile. It is apparent that those plaintiffs who
may recover personal or property damages under the theory of implied war-
ranty are still somewhat limited by the privity requirement. Although economic
losses may be recovered in an action based on implied warranty,23 the privity
requirement once again presents a serious limitation.24
In a further attempt to avoid the privity requirement, plaintiffs turned to
actions based on express warranty. This theory eased significantly the unhappy
plight of the purchaser who suffered economic loss due to a defective product.
Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.,25 although dealing with personal injuries, was the
first case to expound on the theory of express warranty as a basis for liability
of a manufacturer to a consumer in the absence of privity. The court in that
case said:
It would be unjust to recognize a rule that would permit manufacturers
of goods to create a demand for their products by representing that
they possess qualities which they, in fact, do not possess, and then
because there is no privity of contract existing between the consumer
and the manufacturer, deny the consumer the right to recover if
damages result from the absence of those qualities, when such absence
is not readily noticeable.
20
The Baxter case was followed by a line of cases allowing the recovery of eco-
nomic loss when a manufacturer had in some way made an express representa-
118. Colby v. First Nat'l Stores, 307 Mass. 252, 29 N.E.2d 920 (1940); Grinnell v.
Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Corp., 282 Mich. 509, 276 N.W. 535 (1937).
19. Dryden v. Continental Baking Co., 11 Cal. 2d 33, 77 P.2d 833 (1938); Ward Baking
Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928). See Prosser, Torts 678 (3d ed.
1964).
20. Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 ('1939); Heimsoth
v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 1 Ill. App. 2d 28, 116 N.E.2d 193 (1953); Manzoni v. Detroit
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 363 Mich. 235, 109 N.W.2d 918 (1961). See Prosser, Torts 674-76
(3d ed. 1964).
21. 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961).
22. 23 A.D.2d 530, 256 N.Y.S.2d 643 (4th Dep't 1965). But other jurisdictions have
extended coverage to include innocent bystanders; see Mitchell v. Miller, 6 Conn. Supp. 142,
214 A.2d 694 (1965) (action based on strict liability doctrine); Piercefield v. Remington
Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965) (action based on breach of implied
warranty).
23. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-714.
24. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-318.
25. 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409, 88 A.L.R. 521 (1932). See, e.g., Rogerg v. Toni Home
Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612, 75 A.L.R.2d 103 (1958).
26. Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 462-63, 12 P.2d 409, 412, 88 A.L.R.
521, 526 (1932).
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tion of fitness.2 7 A court which disallowed recovery for commercial loss when the
action was based on negligence stated that "upon... express promises or repre-
sentations the purchaser can rely, for they compose a part of the consideration
for the purchase and are meant to be conveyed to and relied upon by the
purchaser.12 8 Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co.,2 0 a leading
New York case, allowed recovery when a plaintiff who had bought supposedly
shrink-proof material found that dresses made from the material did in fact
shrink after being washed. In allowing the plaintiff to recover its economic
losses from the manufacturer who had advertised nationally and had provided
tags which said that the garment had been made shrink-proof by treatment with
its product, the court said:
Since the basis of the liability turns not upon the character of the
product but upon the representation, there is no justification for a dis-
tinction on the basis of the type of injury suffered or the type of article
or goods involved3 0
Although the coverage of protected plaintiffs was greatly broadened in actions
based on express warranty, the theory still presente@ serious obstacles. In many
instances there is no express warranty on which to base an action, and, also, the
manufacturer's use of a disclaimer as allowed under the Uniform Commercial
Code31 might limit plaintiff's recovery.
Because of the limitations placed on the plaintiff in actions based on negli-
gence and contract some courts have recently turned to the doctrine of strict liabil-
ity. The California court has held in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.
3 2
that "a manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the
market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to
have a defect that causes injury to a human being."33 The strict liability doc-
trine has been the source of much confusion in recent years due to the fact
that it sounds both in tort and contract. Deleted from the law of torts was the
necessity of proving how the manufacturer was negligent in producing the
product. Under the doctrine of strict liability the plaintiff need only show that
there was a defect in the product which caused the damages that he suffered. The
class of protected consumers has been widely expanded due to the fact that the
manufacturer's liability is based on an implied warranty created by his market-
27. Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946) (representations in manual
given at time of purchase); Studebaker Corp. v. Nail, 82 Ga. App. 779, 62 S.E.2d 198
(1950) (printed warranty contained in instrument given with product); Simpson v.
American Oil Co., 217 N.C. 542, 8 S.E.2d 813 (1940) (legend on container); Inglis v.
American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965) (mass media advertising);
Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966) (manufacturer's booklets and
trademark). But see Dimoff v. Ernie Majer, Inc., 55 Wash. 2d 385, 347 P.2d 1056 (1960).
28. Silverman v. Samuel Malinger Co., 375 Pa. 422, 429, 100 A.2d 715, 719 (1953).
29. 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962), 27 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 753
(1962), 36 St. John's L. Rev. 325 (1962).
30. Id. at 15, 181 N.E.2d 399, 404, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363, 370.
31. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-719.
32. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
33. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
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ing of the product. Thus, the liability is based on a contractual relationship
between the parties. In addition, the disclaimer provision in the warranty section
of the Uniform Commercial Code34 has been done away with. The Restatement
of Torts has recently recognized the doctrine as a "special liability" of the
manufacturer for defective products which are unreasonably dangerous and
thereby cause harm ". . . to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his prop-
erty. . . . "3 The strict liability doctrine was carried to its limit in Santor v.
A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc.,36 which allowed recovery of economic loss in a
strict liability action, although the court could have based its decision on the
presence of an express warranty, in that the defective carpeting upon which the
claim was based had been advertised and was represented as being of Grade #1
quality.
In the instant case Chief Judge Traynor, speaking for the majority, af-
firmed the trial court's award of damages for lost profits and for money paid on
the purchase price of the truck on the basis of breach of an express warranty
which was contained in the purchase order signed by plaintiff. In its dicta, the
the court limited the Greenman37 holding to situations in which there has been
personal or property damages. The court stated that the reason for this limita-
tion is that if recovery for economic loss was allowed on the basis of strict
liability, the manufacturer would be liable for the business losses of other pur-
chasers for the failure of its product to meet the specific needs of their businesses
even though those needs were communicated only to the dealer. Also, "this
liability could not be disclaimed, for one purpose of strict liability in tort is to
prevent a manufacturer from defining the scope of his responsibility for harm
caused by his product." 38 The court disapproved of the decision in the Santor"9
case in that the award should have been allowed on the basis of express
warranty rather than on the basis of strict liability. Chief Judge Traynor
stated the basis for this distinction in the type of damages allowed in actions
for breach of express warranty and actions based on strict liability:
A ,consumer should not be charged at the will of the manufacturer
with bearing the risk of physical injury when he buys a product on
the market. He can, however, be fairly charged with the risk that the
product will not match his economic expectations unless the manu-
facturer agrees that it will.
40
Judge Peters, in his concurring opinion, stated that the award should have been
affirmed on the basis of strict liability. He stated that the distinction drawn by
the majority in limiting the strict liability doctrine to situations in which there
34. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-719.
35. Restatement (Second), 2 Torts § 402A (1965).
36. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
37. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1962).
38. Instant case at 150, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22 (1965).
39. Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 NJ. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965)..
40. Instant case at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23 (1965).
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has been either personal or property damage is artificial and arbitrary. Judge
Peters suggests that a distinction should, rather, be drawn between the con-
sumer who deals within the world of commerce, ". . . where parties generally
bargain on a somewhat equal plane and may be presumed to be familiar with
the legal problems involved when defective goods are purchased" 41 and the "....
ordinary consumer, who is usually unable to protect himself from insidious con-
tractual provisions such as disclaimers, foisted upon him by commercial enter-
prises whose bargaining power he is seldom able to match. 14 2 He thus maintains
that the "ordinary consumer" should be allowed to recover economic losses in
an action based on strict liability.
In considering the expansion of the strict liability doctrine to include
economic or pecuniary loss, it is significant to note that recovery was never
extended this far in an action based on negligence. In a negligence action, where
the purchaser must either offer proof of the manufacturer's negligence or rely on
res ipsa loquitur, the courts have consistently limited recovery to personal or
property damage. Perhaps the basic reason for this judicial restraint was a
desire to remain within the general framework of the policy decisions underlying
the MacPherson43 rule.
In establishing liability in personal injury cases courts have been
motivated to overlook any necessity for privity because the hazard to
life and health is usually a personal disaster of major proportions to
the individual both physically and financially and something of minor
importance to the manufacturer . . . against which they can protect
themselves by a distribution of risk through the price of the article
sold. There has not been the same social necessity to motivate the
recovery for strictly economic losses where the damaged person's
health, and therefore his basic earning capacity, has remained unim-
paired .... To allow recovery for purely economic losses because they
arise from the same defect is to apply the doctrine of strict liability
when the original motivating factor therefor is not present.4
The courts did not encounter any difficulty in extending the liability based on
negligence to include physical damage to the purchaser's property. This liability
was placed on the manufacturer under the rationale that damage to the pur-
chaser's property was as much to be expected and as reasonable a consequence
of negligent manufacture as was personal injury. Economic loss, on the other
hand, is more speculative, both in the nature of its occurrence and in the amount
of loss suffered. It would appear the courts feared that extension of liability to
include recovery for economic losses would eventually lead to the liability of
a manufacturer ". . . for damages of unknown and unlimited scope."4" In re-
fusing to extend the doctrine, the courts attempted to balance the scales between
41. Id. at 157, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 29.
42. Ibid.
43. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, 1916F L.RA.
696 (1916).
44. Price v. Gatlin, 405 P.2d 502, 504 (Ore. 1965).
45. Instant case at 150-51, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22-23 (1965).
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protection of the innocent purchaser and protection of the manufacturer from
unlimited liability. It can be, however, argued that the strict liability doctrine, if
properly defined and cautiously applied, will allow the courts to grant recovery
for economic losses and still maintain this balance. Such a definition can be
found in the court's reasoning in the Santor4 6 case.
If the article is defective, i.e., not reasonably fit for the ordinary pur-
poses for which such articles are sold and used, and the defect arose
out of the design or manufacture or while the article was in the control
of the manufacturer, and it proximately causes injury or damage to the
ultimate purchaser or reasonably expected consumer, liability exists.
47
On the basis of this definition of strict liability, the court in Santor allowed the
plaintiff ".... the difference between the price paid ... and the actual market
value of the defective carpeting at the time when plaintiff knew or should have
known that it was defective ... .,"48 Allowing plaintiff to recover that amount of
the purchase price which exceeded the value of the carpeting received certainly
does not expose the manufacturer to unlimited liability. It seems clear, then,
that Chief Judge Traynor's reason for rejecting the strict liability doctrine as the
basis for recovery in Santor was that he feared an eventual extension of the
doctrine to include recovery for lost profits, as in the instant case. But the
Santor definition of strict liability leaves no room for the apprehension expressed
by Traynor when he said:
If under these circumstances defendant is strictly liable in tort for
the commercial loss suffered by plaintiff, then it would be liable for
business losses of other truckers caused by the failure of its trucks to
meet the specific needs of their businesses, even though those needs
were communicated only to the dealer.
49
As Judge Peters points out in his concurring opinion, this line of reasoning
seems to equate strict liability and implied warranty of fitness for a particular
use. But under the doctrine of strict liability a manufacturer is liable for any
resultant economic loss, including lost profits, only if his product proves defective
under normal use. Thus, a manufacturer would not be liable under the doctrine
of strict liability if his product merely failed to meet the extraordinary require-
ments of a particular purchaser. The manufacturer's liability is based on an
implied representation of fitness created by the manufacturer's placing of the
product on the market.
Existence of the defect means violation of the representation implicit
in the presence of the article in the stream of trade that it is suitable
for the general purposes for which it is sold and for which such goods
are generally appropriate. 9
46. Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
47. Id. at 66-67, 207 A.2d 305, 313.
48. Id. at 68-69, 207 A.2d 305, 314.
49. Instant case at 150, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22 (1965).
50. Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 NJ. 52, 67, 207 A.2d 305, 313 (1965).
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It is clear that the manufacturer does not open himself to unlimited liability
by placing his product on the market. Under the strict liability doctrine he is
liable only to a "reasonably expected" consumer who suffers damage when he
puts the product he has purchased to a "reasonably expected" use. Judge
Peters' distinction between the ordinary consumer and the consumer familiar
with the world of commercial transactions seems to be valid. That such a dis-
tinction is tenable is made clear by the fact that the Uniform Commercial
Code, adopted by over thirty states, defines the term "merchant" 5' and in
several sections distinguishes between the requirements that must be met by a
merchant and those which must be met by an ordinary consumer.52 The
plaintiff who regularly deals in large commercial transactions is aware of the
benefits of express warranties and the dangers of disclaimers and is usually
in a position which enables him to bargain for a favorable sales contract. The
ordinary consumer is not so well informed and is often in a less advantageous
bargaining position. Unlike the consumer who regularly deals in commerce, he
has ". . . neither adequate knowledge nor sufficient opportunity to determine
if articles bought or used are defective." 53 If the courts were to adopt Judge
Peters' distinction, the ordinary consumer, unaware of the intricacies of war-
ranty law, would receive the protection he needs under the doctrine of strict
liability, while the merchant, familiar with the world of commercial transactions
and aware of the problems involved when defective goods are sold, would
remain under the control of the warranty section of the Code.
STEVEN G. BimEicOIr
51. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-104.
52. N.Y. U.C.C. §§ 2-201, 2-207, 2-209, 2-312, 2-314, 2-403.
53. Santor v, A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 64, 207 A.2d 305, 311 (1969).
